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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
versed. People ex rel. Hudson River Day Line v. Franck, et at.,
Assessors, 257 N. Y. 69, 177 N. E. 312 (1931).
In cases involving tax assessments, the building is real estate, the
owner of which is liable to a realty tax, although as to the owner of
the land on which the building is located it may be personal.'
Such property must be deemed to partake of the nature of
realty 2 and the question of ownership must be decided by an interpretation of the contract.
From the final decision in this case it is evident that the general
rule was applied. 3 The contrary view, taken by the Appellate Division and the Trial Term, is probably based on a previous case 4 in
which Judge Bartlett criticized the generally applied rule. But both
courts failed to sustain their finding on adjudications directly in point.
In refusing literally to construe the meaning of the words in the
agreement, the court is consistent with the position adopted in cases
of similar circumstances. The formidable doctrine of stare decisis
was once more relied upon to stabilize the administration of justice.
W. B, S.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER-LIABILITY OF AUCTIONEER FOR
FALSE REPRESENTATIONS.-Plaintiff, purchaser of a house and lot at

an auction sale, rejected the conveyance on the ground of misrepre-

sentation and defect of title, in that there was a discrepancy between
'Smith and Brittan v. Benson and Peck, 1 Hill 176 (N. Y. 1840) ; Smith
v. City of New York, 68 N. Y. 552 (1877); People ex rel. Van Nest v. Comm.
of Taxes, 80 N. Y. 573 (1880) ; People ex rel. Muller v. Board of Assessors
of the City of Brooklyn, 93 N. Y. 308 (1883).
'TAx LAW (N. Y.) §2, subd. 6.
' "It is a familiar rule that, wheft structures are erected by persons not the
owners of the land, they become part of the realty and as such the property of
the landowner. It requires an agreement to be expressed in order to prevent
the operation of this rule. If the right of removal is reserved to the lessee in a
lease, then, in such a case, he will be regarded as an owner of real estate for
the purpose of taxation. When the lease in question provides that the sheds
are to become the property of the state at its expiration, the language does not
warrant the inference of an intermediate ownership." People ex reL. International Nay. Co. v. Barker, 153 N. Y. 98, 101, 47 N. E. 46, 47 (1897) ; People
ex rel. Van Nest v. Comm. of Taxes, supra note 1; People exr reL N. Y. Elevated R. R. Co. v. Comm. of Taxes, 82 N. Y. 459 (1880); People ex rel.
Muller v. Board of Assessors, supra note 1.
' In a dissenting opinion Judge Bartlett says, "It seems to me clear that it
was the intention of the parties that the shed should remain the property of the
relator until the term specified expired. * * * It is well-settled law in this state
that it is competent for parties by contract to regulate their respective interest
so that one may be the owner of the building and the other of the land. * * * It
is difficult to see what legal obstacle in the case at bar prevented the contracting
parties from entering into covenant. This is nothing more than a contract for
the future transfer of title." People ex rel. International Nay. Co. v. Barker,
supra note 3.

RECENT DECISIONS
the actual dimensions and those stated in the terms of sale signed by
the owner and that although the premises were described as containing "two-room apartments and bath," there were no facilities for
cooking. Appeal by the defendant auctioneer from a judgment
granting plaintiff the amount of the deposit, the expenses of the sale
and for the services of counsel, and charging both owner and auctioneer alike with false and fraudulent representations. Held, auctioneer was only liable as a stakeholder for the amount of the deposit
and should not be held a party to the false representations. Milifield
Realty Co. v. Catena, 256 N. Y. 435, 176 N. E. 830 (1931).
A purchaser at an auction sale has a right of action either
against the auctioneer or the vendor or both, for the recovery of his
deposit, where the vendor cannot give a good title.1 An auctioneer is
a stakeholder and is liable to the buyer for the amount of the deposit
or down payment, until the sale is completed, and unless the sale is
actually completed the auctioneer must hold the deposit as a stakeholder until the law day, when he must return it to the buyer if seller
cannot give good title, or until it is definitely determined to whom it
belongs. 2 In an auction sale, as in other sales, a misrepresentation by
a vendor which would work too severe a hardship on the vendee will
be sufficient to relieve the vendee from performing his contract, since
equity will interpret such misrepresentations most favorably to the
vendee.3 In the instant case, the discrepancy in the dimensions was
sufficient to relieve the vendee from the performance of his contract,
but it is not determined whether the description of the property as
given in the circular, "two-room apartments and bath," is such a
misrepresentation as would relieve the vendor from performance of
the contract of sale. There is an expression that "apartments without
facilities for cooking are today familiar incidents of life in the
metropolis." 4 This seems to be a radical departure from the general
rule that apartments, as understood by the layman, have facilities for
cooking. It appears from this dicta that the exception is now to be
considered the rule and the burden is cast upon the vendee to inquire
whether or not the apartment is so constructed as to provide facilities
for cooking. In the absence of such inquiry of the auctioneer by the
vendee, the misrepresentation cannot be charged against the auctioneer, especially where he makes no further representations than
those contained in the circular.
K. M. K.
1Cockcroft v. Muller, 71 N. Y. 367 (1877); Mahon v. Liscomb, 19
Supp. 224 (C. P. N. Y. 1892).
'Merritt v. Archer, 163 App. Div. 648, 148 N. Y. Supp. 1008 (2d
1914); Gelman v. Day, 227 App. Div. 607, 235 N. Y. Supp. 211 (2d
1929) ; MECHEm, AGENcy (2d ed. 1914) §2348.
'Margraf v. Muir, 57 N. Y. 155 (1874); Hammer v. Michael, 243
445, 154 N. E. 305 (1926).
"Instant case, at 437, 176 N. E. at 831.
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